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ABSTRACT 
 
Crop insurance, in recent years, has displaced U.S. federal farm program payments as the 
most important safety net for net farm income. The business climate that crop insurance 
purchasers and providers face in the future is one of increasing premiums for producers and 
decreasing commissions for crop insurance companies and agents. The primary objective 
of this thesis is to assess the desirability of crop insurance agency acquisitions to increase 
market share for Farm Credit Services of America, considering the significant uncertainties 
in the future subsidy levels and commission levels for these products. Financial analysis 
and modeling crop insurance agency acquisitions is completed under a wide range of future 
economic and political scenarios. The wide range of assumptions, however, does contribute 
to a wide range of potential purchase prices and rates of return on crop insurance agency 
acquisitions. The crop insurance industry faces uncertainty in the future and general 
industry profitability will likely decline. However, an expansion strategy in a period of 
reduced commissions can be profitable if acquisitions are priced appropriately and can be 
made in locations where existing support services can be leveraged to support the 
acquisition. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Crop Insurance 
Crop insurance has many different forms in the U.S. including multi-peril insurance, crop 
revenue coverage, revenue assurance, and traditional crop hail insurance. Crop insurance is 
a critical risk management tool for crop producers in the United States. Crop insurance is 
heavily subsidized through the Farm Bill by United States taxpayers. Net transfers to 
farmers through crop insurance have increased in recent years while government transfers 
through commodity programs have declined (Figure 1.1, Risk Management Agency. 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. cycost 2001-09, page 1). The subsidies provided by 
taxpayers are and will likely continue to be in the future, a target for reduction as the 
United States Congress searches for strategies to reduce the federal deficit. The business 
climate that crop insurance purchasers and providers face in the future is one of uncertainty 
for producers and decreasing commissions for crop insurance companies and agents.  
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Figure 1.1: Commodity Programs Decline While Government Transfers to Farmers 
via Crop Insurance Increase 
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Source: FCIC Financial Statements and USDA Budget Summary and Annual Performance 
Plans 
1.2 Farm Credit Services of America 
Farm Credit Services of America (FCSAmerica) is a cooperative financial services 
provider to over 75,000 farmers, ranchers, and rural residents in the states of Iowa, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Core products include mortgage loans, operating 
loans, equipment loans and leases, and crop insurance. FCSAmerica currently holds a 
significant market share of crop insurance in the four states and has a goal to increase 
market share to thirty-five percent in the four states. FCSAmerica has a broader business 
goal of increasing non-interest revenue sources to further diversify and increase earnings. 
Crop insurance represents the single largest potential non-interest revenue source that 
FCSAmerica can pursue under Farm Credit System regulations. 
FCSAmerica has developed its current crop insurance business through direct sales activity 
performed by Insurance Specialists and Financial Officers. However, FCSAmerica has 
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limited experience with crop insurance agency acquisitions as FCSAmerica has completed 
only two agency acquisitions in its history.  
1.3 Objectives 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine whether agency acquisitions are a 
feasible business strategy to increase the market share for FCSAmerica, given the 
significant uncertainties in the future subsidy levels and commission levels for these 
products. The alternative to agency acquisitions would be to focus energy and resources on 
direct sales activity. A secondary objective of this project is to identify key factors, and the 
metrics of those factors to consider in the evaluation of crop insurance agency acquisition 
opportunities. Identification of these key factors would be helpful in development of 
analytical models that could be used to evaluate the viability of individual acquisition 
opportunities. These factors may also be useful in the determination of purchase price in 
acquisition contracts. 
1.4 Relevance of Crop Insurance 
Crop insurance is important to FCSAmerica and its stockholders for two critical reasons. 
First, crop insurance is a key risk management tool for crop producers. Promoting broad 
use of crop insurance coverage among FCSAmerica’s loan customers provides a critical 
income stabilization mechanism that potentially reduces default risk in FCSAmerica’s loan 
portfolio. This importance is illustrated from the perspective of an individual producer in 
Figure 1.2., that supports the increasing importance of crop insurance as an income 
stabilization tool for producers, as the importance of other government price support 
programs has diminished. 
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Figure 1.2: Iowa Corn Breakeven Costs 
 
Source: Iowa State University – for cost of production and actual state price data 
*2009 estimated state price is based on January 12, 2010 WASDE average 09/10 Marketing Year  price 
*2010 Crop Insurance Protection based on Dec 2010 Futures price of $3.99 
*2010 estimated state price is based on Dec 2010 Futures price of $3.99 less $0.30/bushel basis 
 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationships between the target price for corn, production cost, 
market price, and value insured by an 80% crop insurance policy. Prior to 2007, 
commodity program payments were the primary protection for farm income when market 
prices fall below cost of production. Since 2007, crop insurance has surpassed commodity 
payments as the primary protection for farm income when market prices fall below cost of 
production. Additionally, subsidies of producer premiums are currently exempt from 
maximum Federal payment limitations applied to farm commodity support payments. 
Second, crop insurance agency commissions represent a significant revenue source to 
FCSAmerica, increasing net annual income that benefits FCSAmerica through the lowering 
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of average operating costs, the generation of revenue contributed to capital, and the 
addition of new customers that represent cross-selling opportunities for loan products. 
1.5 Project Strategy 
The recommendations and strategy researched and reported will also be used as a 
component of FCSAmerica’s business strategy for its insurance division. The following 
chapters will research available literature and document the theory, methods, and 
procedures used to accomplish the objectives of this thesis.  
First, a conclusion will need to be arrived at regarding the future viability and profitability 
of crop insurance products. Second, a relative expected return on investment will be 
determined. The information necessary to determine the required return on investment or 
opportunity cost will be obtained from FCSAmerica’s internal business accounting records 
and opportunity cost will be measured based on FCSAmerica’s incremental cost of capital 
and other competing opportunities for capital. Last, a valuation model will be used to 
determine the relevant characteristics that are important to valuing an agency as well as the 
major factors contributing to retention and renewal rates in an acquired agency. 
FCSAmerica’s data on two previous acquisitions are used extensively in this analysis.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Crop Insurance History 
The United States Congress first authorized Federal crop insurance in the 1930s, creating 
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Crop insurance remained largely 
experimental until passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. The 1980 Act was 
targeted at encouraging participation to replace the disaster coverage, provided at no cost to 
producers, under previous Farm Bills. The 1980 Act authorized a subsidy equal to 30 
percent of the premium at a 65 percent coverage level. In spite of the changes enacted by 
the 1980 Act, annual ad hoc disaster bills continued to compete with the crop insurance 
program. This led to the enactment of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. Key 
changes with the 1994 Act included required participation at certain levels, catastrophic 
coverage (CAT) for producers to be eligible for other USDA program benefits, subsidies 
for higher coverage levels were increased, and the creation of the Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) to administer FCIC programs (Risk Management Agency, page 1).   
Crop insurance, in its various forms, has a varied history in the United States. In many 
areas of the United States, multi-peril insurance products are not commercially viable 
without government premium subsidies. The reasons include, but are not limited to, various 
forms of incomplete markets, adverse selection, and/or moral hazards (Chambers).  For 
these reasons, a unique aspect of the Federal crop insurance program has been the role of 
private insurance companies in program delivery and in risk sharing. Private insurance 
companies not only sell and service crop insurance policies, but also share underwriting 
risks with the Federal government (Coble, et. al.). The role of the Federal government is 
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believed to be necessary due to the widespread disparity in underwriting risks across 
regions and crops, and the desire of the United States Congress to make crop insurance 
available broadly to producers in all areas and across a broad range of crops. Risk sharing 
and servicing costs are shared between the Federal government and private insurance 
companies through the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). Key requirements under 
the SRA, include the requirement of a participating company to offer coverage to any 
farmer in a state the insurance company offers insurance. In exchange, the insurance 
company is allowed to place some crop insurance policies in an Assigned Risk Fund, 
where exposure to loss is minimal and other policies in funds where gains and losses are 
greater and retained by the company (Coble, et. al.). The RMA also sets the premium rates 
for all crop insurance products in the United States. 
The Federal government provides subsidies for insurance through three basic mechanisms, 
subsidizing producer premiums, administrative and operating expense reimbursements, and 
providing reinsurance for high-risk production areas. The Farm Bills have encouraged 
increasing producer participation and increased producer coverage levels through increased 
subsidy levels up to and including the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 
(Babcock and Hart). The ARPA set up a mechanism to increase the development of new 
products and focused on revenue insurance as well as yield insurance. Another goal of the 
ARPA was to increase the role and participation of private insurance companies in 
underwriting the risks of crop insurance products. 
Currently, sixteen companies and over 15,000 agents provide delivery of the crop insurance 
program in the United States (Rain and Hail Insurance Society). The insurance policy is a 
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contract between the insured and the insurance company. For the producer to receive the 
Federal premium subsidy the private insurance company must use the Federal underwriting 
standards and rates set by the RMA (Rain and Hail Insurance Society). 
2.2 Current Coverage and Subsidy Levels in the Industry 
Based on statistics through the 2008 crop year, Federal crop insurance programs have been 
successful in increasing acreage and coverage levels and in reducing the need for disaster 
programs and other farm program subsidies. Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of crop 
insurance as a risk management tool and the cost of subsidy components before and after 
implementation of the 2008 Farm Bill.  
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Crop Insurance from Risk Management Tool to a Complete 
Farming Safety Net 
 
Source:  FCIC Financial Statements February 2010 
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Based on 2008 information, 65% of eligible acres in the United States were insured and 
89% of those acres were buy up contracts, defined as coverage greater than catastrophic 
coverage. The total premium paid for this coverage was $9.8 billion. The federal paid 
premium was $5.7 billion and the producer paid premium was $4.1 billion (Rain and Hail 
Insurance Society). The crop value insured was $89.9 billion. The covered acreage levels 
were higher in the Corn Belt states where acreage coverage levels are from 67% to 89%. 
2.3 Impact of the 2008 Farm Bill on Future Subsidies and Insurance Company and 
Agent Compensation 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Security Act of 2008, known as the 2008 Farm Bill, 
was enacted on May 22, 2008. The passage of the 2008 Farm Bill marked a turning point in 
crop insurance. The 2008 Farm Bill was estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to 
reduce federal subsidies by $3.9 billion in the years 2008 through 2012 (Parkerson and 
Tronnes). The spending cuts targeted Administrative and Operating payments to the 
insurance companies, but agent commissions are likely to be reduced by a similar amount 
as a result of the increased administrative payments that must be paid by the private 
insurance companies. The 2008 Farm Bill also allowed the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) to renegotiate the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) once every 
five years, beginning with the 2010-2011 reinsurance year (Parkerson and Tronnes). This 
renegotiation process has generated several studies on the “reasonable” rate of return to the 
private insurance companies via the SRA. The crop insurance industry generally views the 
impact of the 2008 Farm Bill as making the crop insurance industry even less profitable 
relative to the property and casualty insurance sector than it has been in the past (Parkerson 
and Tronnes). 
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2.4 Current Industry Trends and Threats 
In preparation for renegotiation of the SRA, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
engaged Milliman, Inc. to prepare a rate of return analysis. These reports were completed 
June 23, 2009 and August 18, 2009. The Milliman Reports generally concluded that the 
actual rate of return to MPCI insurers from 1989 through 2008 was 17.1% as compared to a 
reasonable rate of return for the same period of 12.8%. Although the reports recognize the 
impact of the frequency of catastrophic loss events, the conclusion is that MPCI insurers 
received a return in excess of the cost of capital for the period (Appel and Borba, August 
18, 2009 and June 23, 2009). The Milliman Reports have generated an Industry Response 
by the National Crop Insurance Services, Inc. that cautions against drawing strong 
conclusions from the studies and concludes that the actual rate of return for the industry 
would be significantly below the reasonable rate of return. Six specific concerns not 
accounted for in the Milliman Reports were discussed, including the 2008 Farm Bill 
reductions in Administrative and Operating payments. These specific concerns and the 
report in general contend that historical rates of return are not an appropriate measure of the 
profitability of the current SRA (Grant Thornton). Other recent events and actions by 
Congress and the Obama Administration have raised the likelihood of a reduction in federal 
support for crop insurance programs. In late March of 2009, the Senate Budget Committee 
approved their budget resolution with cuts of $350 million for crop insurance and increases 
of $175 million for child nutrition programs (Parkerson). Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack 
has also made statements indicating that private insurance companies have made huge 
profits on crop insurance and that taxpayers need a fairer deal (Wyant). 
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2.5 Conclusions from the Literature Review 
The literature provided substantial information outlining the history of crop insurance in the 
United States, particularly regarding the role of Federal subsidies, past and current. 
Substantial positive support for the need for private insurance companies, including the role 
of agents in delivery of crop insurance products exists. There is also substantial support for 
premium subsidies and risk sharing. The literature did not yield any existing direct research 
or evaluation models on the specific objective of this thesis, which is the economics of crop 
insurance agency acquisitions. However, it did reveal support for the importance of 
understanding and evaluating the role and future level of Federal subsidies in crop 
insurance products. The literature also highlighted the state of change that the industry is 
experiencing in subsidy levels and the significant uncertainties this represents to future 
returns to private insurance companies in delivery costs and risk sharing of underwriting 
future crop policies. These uncertainties are highly correlated to future agent premium 
levels and essential to evaluate when considering an agency acquisition. 
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CHAPTER III: THEORY 
 
3.1 Economic Theory 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine whether agency acquisitions are a 
feasible business strategy to increase market share for FCSAmerica, considering significant 
uncertainties in future subsidy levels and commission levels for these products. Insurance 
agency acquisition opportunities exist in the form of purchase opportunities on portfolios of 
existing crop insurance customers offered by independent agents desiring to exit the 
industry for various reasons. The assets being acquired consist of existing insurance 
policies as well as the relationships developed with customers by the previous agency. 
Since the choice of insurance agents by crop producers is relationship oriented, an agency 
acquisition has characteristics of a tangible asset in the form of the policies and 
characteristics and an intangible asset in the form of the relationships being acquired. In 
both cases, the assets being purchased are anticipated to produce a future cash flow in the 
form of commissions on future policies. Therefore, the basic economic theory selected to 
evaluate feasibility of agency acquisitions is investment analysis and more specifically net 
present value analysis (Brealey, Myers, and Allen).  
Net present value theory is well suited to this project since the theory expresses the value of 
an investment in current dollars that can be equated to the potential purchase price of a crop 
insurance policy portfolio. Since the investment in this case is expected to generate policy 
commissions for years into the future, a discounted cash flow formula can be used to value 
that investment. The net present value of an agency acquisition will be determined by 
estimating a five year net cash flow from the acquisition, discounting that cash flow to 
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present dollars based on FCSAmerica’s cost of capital, and deducting the proposed 
purchase price of the agency. A five year time frame was used primarily to match the 
business objectives of FCSAmerica, but this time period also matches the life of a farm bill. 
Assumptions used for the income and expense components of the cash flow model are from 
industry sources, research, and FCSAmerica’s actual history. 
Even though the use of discounted cash flow analysis may be relatively straightforward, 
there are many factors influencing the level of the net revenue to be evaluated. Some of the 
factors that influence future revenue include, but are not limited to, volatility of commodity 
prices, federal government subsidy levels, agent commission levels, retention rate of 
customers, and expansion or contraction of acres insured by customers. The factors 
selected for analysis include commodity price fluctuations including the levels used for 
commission rates, policy retention rates, and commission rates. Since commodity price 
levels and agent commission rates are both currently under negotiation through the SRA, a 
major component of this project will consist of a sensitivity analysis for a potential range of 
possibilities for these factors. The sensitivity analysis will also be useful in demonstrating 
the impact on purchase price and return on investment when these major factors change. 
Another investment analysis tool is the internal rate of return. The advantage of the 
supplemental use of the internal rate of return is the ability to compare the degree of 
various scenarios in either exceeding or falling short of a targeted rate of return. However, 
net present value analysis delivers a single valuation in current dollars, which equates to 
and can be related to a potential purchase price of an agency. 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS 
 
4.1 Analysis of High Impact Components 
To use NPV analysis to evaluate the feasibility of insurance agency acquisitions, it is 
necessary to build an income and expense forecasting model. Because NPV is forward 
looking, retained premium data and other forward looking assumptions are important 
factors for the analysis. Recent historical premium data can be made available from a 
prospective purchase target and the historical pricing of crop insurance agencies is usually 
determined as a multiple of the last year’s commission income. Commission income is an 
estimate of the last year’s premium income. The forecasting model must adjust for factors 
impacting the retained premium into the future, apply the commission percentage, and then 
determine the incremental expenses that are necessary to maintain and service the acquired 
policies. A review of the literature and experience in the industry reveals that the highest 
impact components to future crop insurance revenue streams are future values of 
commodities insured, future commission rates that are impacted by Federal crop insurance 
subsidy levels, and the retention rate of policies from the acquired agency. Another 
potential factor to consider in acquisition analysis is the impact on the purchasing 
company’s local market share. 
4.2 Gross Premiums and Commodity Prices 
In the crop insurance industry, the gross premium is impacted by the underlying price of 
the commodity insured. If the price of the insured crop doubles, then the amount of the 
premium paid approximately doubles. Agent commissions vary by region, but are set from 
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16% to 19% of the premium (Rhonda Smith, e-mail message to author, March 11, 2010). 
Because of these premium and agent commission relationships, commodity price 
expectations have a high impact on future revenues. The challenge is to develop a forecast 
of premium levels and find a relationship between historical premium levels and expected 
future commodity prices. Commodity prices are forecasted using a regression model 
derived from U.S. farm price and crop insurance premium amounts for corn, soybeans, and 
wheat. To use a regression model tied to farm price, the analysis uses commodity price 
forecasts for farm prices for the three major insured commodities that are available from 
the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). Historical USDA prices are 
used as the independent variables in the regression analysis. 
Base case commodity price forecasts were modeled using FAPRI’s 2009 forecasts for 
commodity prices and yields from 2010 through 2014 (Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute), illustrated in Table 5.2. In addition to the base case commodity 
forecast, commodity price forecasts were also modeled on a +10% increase from FAPRI’s 
commodity price forecasts for the years 2011 through 2014 set at levels currently proposed 
in RMA’s SRA Draft2. These prices consist of a corn price of $2.83 per bushel and a 
soybean price of $7.07 per bushel in 2011, a corn price of $2.70 per bushel and a soybean 
price of $6.75 per bushel in 2012, and a corn price of $2.57 per bushel and a soybean price 
of $6.43 per bushel in 2013 and beyond. These prices are all subject to further reduction, if 
market prices are lower. 
 16 
 
4.3 Accounting for Future Changes in Subsidy Levels 
The literature and a general consensus in the industry indicate a reduction in Federal 
subsidies in the future. Currently, negotiations are underway with the industry and USDA’s 
Risk Management Agency to adjust the servicing cost subsidy administered through the 
SRA. In addition, the subsidy levels of premiums paid by the Federal government are 
expected to be reduced in future farm bills. Consensus in the industry is that any reductions 
in servicing and premium subsidies to the insurance companies will be passed through to 
the agents in the form of lower agent premiums. The political nature of these factors makes 
forecasting future agent premiums difficult. Therefore, the model will adjust expected 
agent commission levels based on a percentage of anticipated reduction and crop year that 
specific reductions are expected to be effective. This will provide a dynamic modeling 
process that can be adjusted according to user assumptions and the latest information 
available. In addition, breakeven analysis and alternative scenarios will be analyzed. 
4.4 Policy Retention Forecasting 
Forecasting policy retention consists of estimating the percent of policies that are lost 
through the acquisition of the crop insurance agency. The crop insurance business is 
relationship oriented and there are generally several competing alternatives for a producer’s 
business in the marketplace. The sale of an agency can cause other competitors to compete 
for customers. In this study, actual attrition levels in the first and second year after closing 
for two previous acquisitions are analyzed to establish a range of attrition rates, a 
recommended or default attrition rate for the base model, and a term of years to apply the 
attrition rate. 
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4.5 Allocation of Incremental Operating and Servicing Expenses 
Additional sales and support staff may be needed to service additional policies from an 
acquisition. These costs are estimated based on the history of human resource needs and 
expenses in FCSAmerica’s Insurance Division. Although the model can include other 
incremental expenses, these are relatively minor and not significant for acquisition 
evaluation, since most other expenses are fixed FCSAmerica overhead. 
4.6 Assumptions on Opportunity Cost of Capital and ROI 
The NPV model developed for this project assumes that insurance agency acquisitions are 
funded with 86% debt capital and 14% equity capital, which approximates the financial 
leverage position of FCSAmerica. The cost of debt capital is adjustable, but will initially be 
assumed to be 5.5%. This is an estimate of the long term average marginal cost of debt to 
FCSAmerica, even though current marginal cost of debt is significantly lower. The model 
will calculate an NPV that is directly comparable to the acquisition price of potential 
purchase opportunities. The model will also calculate a multiple of the last year’s 
commission income, consistent with standard industry measures, as well as calculate an 
internal rate of return (IRR) for alternative investment analysis reference purposes for 
FCSAmerica. 
4.7 Tax Issues 
The NPV model developed for this project does not include any calculation or 
consideration of income taxes in the cash flow. The model is developed for comparison of 
crop insurance acquisitions for FCSAmerica and is consistent with the business view of 
other competing investment alternatives, which are analyzed on a pre-tax view. There are 
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also typically no depreciable fixed assets included in typical crop insurance agency 
acquisitions. Thus, the results of the analysis are not affected by tax rate assumptions.  
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CHAPTER V: ACQUISITION MODEL PROCEDURES 
 
5.1 Crop Insurance Premium Forecasting 
Crop insurance premiums have varied significantly over the last ten years and the 
variability has been even more significant in the last three years, due to increasing 
commodity prices and to an increase in the volatility of commodity prices. The gross 
premium over the last ten years for crop insurance for corn  ranged from a low of $613 
million in 1999 to a high of $3.8 billion in 2008 (Rain and Hail Insurance Society, pages 
95-97). The primary determinants of crop insurance premiums are yield, commodity price 
levels, the type of policy purchased, and the level of coverage selected. The model used to 
forecast premium levels is a regression model with a dependent variable of gross U.S. 
premium for corn and the independent variables are the commodity price lagged one year 
and average yield. From 1999 through 2008, there is a 0.946 correlation between the one-
year lagged corn price (U.S. farm price average) and the gross premium for all types of 
crop insurance policies written (Table 5.1). Commodity price is the most important factor 
that determines premiums and the lagged price correlates more closely than current year 
price (0.926), perhaps because the premium for most insurance products is set based on the 
average February closing price for corn in the year of the production of the insured crop 
(Table 5.1). The February average date correlates most closely with the average farm price 
of the previous marketing year.  
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Table 5.1: Crop Insurance Premium Correlation Analysis 
3 Years 10 Years
Corn
  Prem/Price (Current) 0.8468 0.9262
  Prem/Price (Lagged) 0.9692 0.9456
  Prem/Yield 0.9192 0.6287
Source: RMA Nationwide Summary by State/Commodity as of 5/7/09  
The second independent variable is the national average yield. National average yield 
shows a 0.629 correlation factor to the gross premium for corn over the last ten years 
(Table 5.1). Crop insurance premiums are based on commodity price times yield. There is a 
trend of gradually increasing yields and premiums are based on a 10 year rolling average of 
actual proven historical yields (APH). APH’s have been gradually rising, and should 
correlate with increasing single year national average yields. It is believed that this variable 
will provide some of the pull upward on crop insurance premiums and enhance the 
predictive capacity of the model compared with commodity prices alone.  
The individual observations for the corn and soybean crop premium regression models are 
documented in Table 5.2. The turquoise shaded areas represent actual historical prices and 
yields from USDA and the yellow shaded areas represent forecasted prices and yields from 
FAPRI. 
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Table 5.2: Independent Variable Sources for Regression Equations 
Year 
Corn 
Premium 
 (in 000s)   
Corn 
Yield  
Lagged 
Corn 
Price  
SB Premium 
(in 000s)   
SB 
Yield  
Lagged 
SB 
Price 
1999  $       612,806  133.8 1.94   $      374,954  36.6 4.93 
2000  $       750,843  136.9 1.82   $      456,187  38.1 4.63 
2001  $       877,214  138.2 1.85   $      509,905  39.6 4.54 
2002  $       920,760  129.3 1.97   $      495,054  38.0 4.38 
2003  $    1,107,311  142.2 2.32   $      615,901  33.9 5.53 
2004  $    1,417,241  160.3 2.42   $      943,561  42.2 7.34 
2005  $    1,276,114  147.9 2.06   $      873,155  43.1 5.74 
2006  $    1,569,523  149.1 2.00   $   1,042,818  42.9 5.66 
2007  $    3,129,615  150.7 3.04   $   1,066,062  41.7 6.43 
2008  $    3,834,516  153.9 4.20   $   2,609,488  39.7 10.10 
2009 165.2 3.90  44.0 9.25 
2010 158.0 3.71  42.1 8.75 
2011 160.0 3.69  42.5 8.78 
2012 161.9 3.85  42.9 9.08 
2013 163.9 3.88  43.2 9.30 
2014 165.9 4.02  43.6 9.55 
2015 168.0 4.09  44.0 9.78 
2016 170.3 4.14  44.4 9.94 
2017 172.3 4.11  44.9 9.99 
2018     174.3  4.10      45.2  10.03 
Source: RMA Nationwide Summary by State/Commodity 5/7/09 
Source: FAPRI 2009 Agricultural Outlook 
Source: USDA NASS    
 
The model for crop insurance premium level for corn is: 
Corn Crop Premiumt = B0 + B1(Lagged Corn Pricet) + B2(Yieldt) + et 
The results of the regression analysis indicate a good fit based on an adjusted R square of 
88% and statistically significant parameter estimates. Table 5.3 summarizes the standard 
errors and significances. 
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Table 5.3: Corn Crop Insurance Premium Regression Model, 1999 - 2008 
Regression Statistics 
R Square 0.904 
Adjusted R Square 0.877 
Standard Error 376456 
Observations 10 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -3403117 2032874 -1.674 0.138 
Lagged Corn Price 1264595 207203 6.103 0.000 
Corn Yield 13629 15755 0.865 0.416 
 
The coefficients of both independent variables have the expected positive sign (Table 5.3), 
which is the logical expected impact on the dependent variable. The t statistic for the 
lagged corn price supports a strong statistical significance for this independent variable. 
The t statistic for corn yield does not support a statistical significance (< 1% level of 
significance) for this variable (41.6% level of significance). However, this variable was left 
in the equation due to the positive sign and the influence of yield on crop insurance 
premium. Overall, the regression model is believed to be adequate and reliable in 
forecasting corn premium amounts for the agency acquisition model. 
Forecasts of the corn premiums for the U.S. for the years 2009 through 2018, as well as the 
historical premiums for the years 1998 through 2008, are illustrated in Figure 5.1. The 
independent variables for both yield and farm price are based on Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) forecasts (January 2010). 
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Figure 5.1: Historical & Forecasted Corn Premium 
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The same methodology was followed to estimate a regression based forecasting model for 
soybeans. Corn and soybeans, in varying percentages, constitute the major crops produced 
and insured in any potential agency acquisition in FCSAmerica’s targeted counties and 
states.  
The result of the regression analysis for soybeans also indicates a good fit based on an 
adjusted R square of 87%. Table 5.4 summarizes the standard errors and significances. 
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Table 5.4: Soybean Crop Insurance Premium Regression Model, 1999 - 2008 
Regression Statistics 
R Square 0.898 
Adjusted R Square 0.868 
Standard Error 236995 
Observations 10 
  Coefficients
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -1600737 1047799 -1.528 0.170 
Lagged Soybean 
Price 352420 47656 7.395 0.000 
Soybean Yield 10366 27539 0.376 0.718 
 
The coefficients of both independent variables have the expected positive sign, which is the 
logical expected impact on the dependent variable (Table 5.4). The t statistic for the lagged 
soybean price supports a strong statistical significance (< 1% level of significance) for this 
independent variable. The t statistic for soybean yield does not support a statistical 
significance for this variable (71.8% level of significance). However, this variable was left 
in the equation due to the positive sign and the influence of yield on soybean insurance 
premium. Overall, the regression model is believed to be adequate and reliable in 
forecasting soybean premium amounts for the agency acquisition model. 
Forecasts of the soybean premiums for the years 2009 through 2018, as well as the 
historical premiums for the years 1998 through 2008, are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The 
independent variables for both national average yield and farm price are based on FAPRI 
forecasts (January 2010). 
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Figure 5.2: Historical & Forecasted Soybean Premium 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
$ 
M
ill
io
ns
Historical Forecasted
 
A major change has been proposed by the RMA, SRA Draft 2 that would adjust the manner 
in which agent commissions are calculated. This proposal removes the volatility of 
commodity price cycles, and reduces federal subsidy levels under the current proposed 
formula by using a fixed commodity price on which agent commissions are calculated for 
the five year term of the SRA beginning in 2011. The potential impact to adjusted gross 
premiums for corn and soybeans is illustrated using the regression models. The estimates 
are calculated by using the fixed SRA Draft2 proposed commodity prices as the 
independent variables for prices in 2011 through 2018. This results in a reduction of 
adjusted gross premium for corn in 2011 of 31.58% and for soybeans of 31.16%. 
Reduction levels are similar in 2012 and the following years and are illustrated in Figure 
5.3 and Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.3: Forecasted Corn Premium with SRA Draft2 Impact 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
$ 
M
illi
on
s
SRA Draft 2
FAPRI
ForecastHistorical
 
Figure 5.4: Forecasted Soybean Premium with SRA Draft2 Impact 
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The results of these premium forecasts are incorporated into the acquisition model through 
the use of an index factor table. The index factor uses the revenue forecast in a base year 
and then indexes the other years to that base year.  
For a typical acquisition, a seller prices the agency from last year’s commission level, 
which directly relates to last year’s gross premiums. An example of the conversion of the 
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corn premium forecast to the corn index factors is shown in Table 5.5. This index table 
enables the conversion of the commodity crop insurance premium forecast to a basis that is 
relevant to the target agency’s policy portfolio. In the example in Table 5.5, the base year is 
2009. The base year coincides with the year that the agency’s premium and commission are 
being priced from. The index for the first year in the forecast is 2010, so the ratio for 2010 
is determined by the premium forecasted for 2010 of $3,441,912,000 divided by the 
premium in the base year (2009) of $3,780,314,000, which yields an index ratio for 2010 of 
0.91. This ratio is then used in the agency acquisition model to forecast the agency 
premium for 2010. 
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Table 5.5: Corn Premium Forecast to Index Conversion 
Year Premium in 000s Price Lagged Yield 2009 Ratio
1999 612,806$              1.94 133.8 0.16            
2000 750,843$              1.82 136.9 0.20            
2001 877,214$              1.85 138.2 0.23            
2002 920,760$              1.97 129.3 0.24            
2003 1,107,311$           2.32 142.2 0.29            
2004 1,417,241$           2.42 160.3 0.37            
2005 1,276,114$           2.06 147.9 0.34            
2006 1,569,523$           2.00 149.1 0.42            
2007 3,129,615$           3.04 150.7 0.83            
2008 3,834,516$           4.20 153.9 1.01            
2009 3,780,314$           3.90 165.2 1.00            
2010 3,441,912$           3.71 158.0 0.91            
2011 3,443,879$           3.69 160.0 0.91            
2012 3,672,109$           3.85 161.9 0.97            
2013 3,737,305$           3.88 163.9 0.99            
2014 3,941,606$           4.02 165.9 1.04            
2015 4,058,749$           4.09 168.0 1.07            
2016 4,153,325$           4.14 170.3 1.10            
2017 4,142,645$           4.11 172.3 1.10            
2018 4,157,257$           4.10 174.3 1.10            
Source: RMA Nationwide Summary by State/Commodity as of 5/7/2009
Source: USDA NASS
Source: FAPRI 2009 Agricultural Outlook
Predited US Corn Premium  
5.2 Policy Retention Rates 
The second major variable in the agency acquisition model is policy retention. Policy 
retention is defined as the remaining policies less the loss that occurs with a change of 
ownership in an agency. The data available to analyze retention rates are limited to actual 
results from two agency acquisitions made by FCSAmerica, both in 2007. Retention rates 
are measured routinely and annually on FCSAmerica’s entire insurance portfolio. Some 
loss of policies occurs annually due to customers retiring or not purchasing coverage, but 
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the most frequent cause of loss is due to competition. FCSAmerica’s portfolio retention 
rate was 92% in 2008 and 91% in 2009 (Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6: Crop Insurance Agency Acquisitions – Policy Retention 
Year 1 Year 2 
Relative  Relative  
    Customers Lost Retention   Retention   Retention Retention
Acquisition A           658  30 95% 88%
Regional Peers        2,553  178 93% 2% 91% -3%
Association 
Total        8,411  668 92% 3% 91% -3%
Acquisition B           190  55 71% 88%
Regional Peers        2,397  146 94% -23% 93% -5%
Association 
Total          8,411  668 92%   -21%   91% -3%
 
FCSAmerica’s two acquisitions consisted of a large agency (Acquisition A) and a small 
agency (Acquisition B). Acquisition A had a gross premium in 2007 of $11.5 million and 
commission income of 18.5% or $2.13 million. Acquisition A was a multi-salesperson 
agency with a total of five sales agents and FCSAmerica employed and retained three of 
those sales agents. Acquisition B had a gross premium of $1.5 million and commission 
income of 17.8% or $270,000. Acquisition B was a single-salesperson agency with one 
other support employee. FCSAmerica did not retain either the agent/owner or the support 
employee.  
Table 5.6 summarizes two years of post acquisition retention rates for Acquisitions A and 
B, as well as relative comparisons to their regional peer groups and the FCSAmerica 
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Association averages. Acquisition A experienced a 2% better retention rate in the first year 
than its peer group, while acquisition B experienced a 23% worse retention rate than its 
peer group in the first year following closing. In the second year, Acquisition A 
experienced a 3% worse retention rate than its peers, while Acquisition B experienced a 5% 
worse retention rate than its peers. 
A review of the retention data with FCSAmerica’s Insurance Leadership Team indicates 
that the two examples probably reveal close to a best case example and a worst case 
example of retention rates after an acquisition. Acquisition A represents a customer base 
that was accustomed to a larger company atmosphere with multiple employees interacting 
with customers, similar to the business style of FCSAmerica. Acquisition A also involved 
retaining a high percentage of the former employees that resulted in fewer new 
relationships for the customers. Conversely, Acquisition B represents a customer base that 
was not accustomed to interacting with multiple employees and there was no retention of 
the former agent as an employee, resulting in each customer experiencing a new personal 
relationship with their sales representative. This leaves the customers vulnerable to other 
sales representatives in the local marketplace. The performance indicates that the first year 
is the most vulnerable to lower than average retention rates in that the retention rate for the 
second year is nearly equal to FCSAmerica’s current portfolio retention rate. 
This analysis is incorporated into the acquisition model through separate policy retention 
factors for the first and second year following the acquisition. The model assumes that by 
the third year the customers have settled into the FCSAmerica portfolio and no additional 
attrition needs to be accounted for. The agency acquisition model assumes that organic 
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growth will off-set normal retention loss in years three through five. The agency acquisition 
model is designed so that the model can adjust the first and second year retention rates 
based on size of agency, local competitive environment, employees retained, seller 
retention incentives in the acquisition contract, and retention skills and efforts of the 
FCSAmerica specialists assigned to the acquired policies. 
5.3 Commission Level Assumptions 
The third major variable in the agency acquisition model is commission rate. Historically, 
commission rates have been relatively stable and predictable. Commission rates, however, 
are not universal in the industry as they are determined annually by the various insurance 
companies that agencies represent. An industry average for small to mid-sized agencies is 
18.5%. The 18.5% commission factor is used in the model to estimate the commission 
multiple based on the acquisition price and gross premium for the base year for the 
potential acquisition.  
Future commission rates, however, will likely face reductions in 2011 and beyond. 
USDA’s RMA has already enacted reductions in Administrative & Operating (A & O) 
reimbursements to crop insurance companies that will result in reductions in commissions 
passed through to agents. More significantly, the latest draft of the SRA proposed by RMA 
has a commission cap for agents at 80% of the proposed A & O reimbursement. For 
example, this proposal would, for an 80% coverage level policy, result in a limit on agency 
commission of 15.5% (Mike Barrett, e-mail message to author, February 26, 2010). There 
is significant industry and related party opposition to this size of cut in commissions and to 
the fixed commodity price proposal in the currently proposed draft of the SRA. This issue 
 32 
 
will not be resolved until June of 2010 when the final decisions on the new SRA must be 
complete. However, it would appear that the industry will likely experience a commission 
reduction of 20%, with a potential range of 5-30% (Mike Barrett, personal discussion with 
author, March 15, 2010). 
The agency acquisition model is designed with a commission adjustment factor that will 
reduce agent commission levels from the baseline year by a percentage factor, beginning 
with the 2011 insurance year and continuing through the remaining years in the model. 
5.4 Other Model Assumptions 
A five year income stream was assumed. The investment recovery period is estimated as 
five years, as it is anticipated that the agency policies would be fully integrated into the 
existing portfolio after year five to the point that it would not be determinable if the 
customers would have been attracted by other business development channels. It is also the 
desire of FCSAmerica leadership to see a full recovery of any acquisition investments in a 
three to five year timeframe. 
Additional income sources that are added to the model include crop hail commissions and 
crop insurance company profit sharing. Both are sources of income that would occur from 
an agency acquisition, but neither revenue source is large relative to other net income 
sources. These revenue sources are estimated at 1.5% and 0.5% of retained premiums 
annually. These estimates represent FCSAmerica’s average on its existing portfolio and are 
not varied in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER VI: SENSITIVITY AND VARIOUS SCENARIO COMPARISONS 
 
6.1 Objectives of Sensitivity Analysis 
The primary objective of the multiple scenario analysis is to test the reliability and 
reasonableness of the model in evaluating potential agency purchases. A secondary 
objective of the sensitivity analysis is to provide ranges to consider in the overall project 
objective of assessing the feasibility of crop insurance agency acquisitions. 
6.2 Output Measures 
Output measures selected for analysis include a comparison of the net present value of a 
purchase in 2010 for an agency located in western Iowa with similar characteristics of 
FCSAmerica’s Acquisition A. Each scenario estimates the NPV using a purchase price of 
2.5 times the 2009 commission generated by the agency, the internal rate of return using a 
purchase price at 2.5 times commission, the breakeven price that could be paid for the 
agency, and the breakeven commission multiple. 
The sensitivity analysis examined alternative assumptions for commodity prices, policy 
retention rates, and commission reductions in 2011 and beyond. The sensitivity analysis 
summary is illustrated in Table 6.1. Figure 6.1 illustrates the model, with input components 
highlighted in yellow and turquoise for the base case commodity scenario with a 20% 
commission reduction and retention rates of 92% in year 1 and 90% in year 2. 
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Figure 6.1: Agency Acquisition Model – Base Case Commodity 
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Table 6.1: Sensitivity Analysis Summary for Hypothetical Agency Acquisition 
000s 000s
NPV IRR Breakeven Breakeven 
Scenario At 2.5X At 2.5X Price Multiple
Best Case Commodity (FAPRI + 10%)
   Best Retention (95% Year 1, 95% Year 2) 1,431$  15.8% 6,981$       3.14
   Base Retention (92% Year 1, 90% Year 2) 878$     12.3% 6,427$       2.90
   Worst Retention (75% Year 1, 85% Year 2) (559)$    2.0% 4,991$       2.25
Base Case Commodity (FAPRI Forecast)
   Best Retention (95% Year 1, 95% Year 2) 609$     10.4% 6,159$       2.77
   Base Retention (92% Year 1, 90% Year 2) 106$     7.1% 5,656$       2.55
   Worst Retention (75% Year 1, 85% Year 2) (1,200)$ -3.2% 4,350$       1.96
Worst Case Commodity (SRA Draft2)
   Best Retention (95% Year 1, 95% Year 2) (1,849)$ -10.4% 3,701$       1.67
   Base Retention (92% Year 1, 90% Year 2) (2,149)$ -14.0% 3,400$       1.53
   Worst Retention (75% Year 1, 85% Year 2) (2,936)$ -26.1% 2,613$       1.18
Commission Sensitivity (10-30% Reduction)
   Base Commodity, Base Retention (-10%) 718$     11.1% 6,268$       2.82
   Base Commodity, Base Retention (-20%) 106$     7.1% 5,656$       2.55
   Base Commodity, Base Retention (-30%) (506)$    2.6% 5,044$       2.27
   Worst Commodity, Base Retention (-10%) (1,787)$ -9.7% 3,763$       1.70
   Worst Commodity, Base Retention (-20%) (2,149)$ -14.0% 3,400$       1.53
   Worst Commodity, Base Retention (-30%) (2,511)$ -19.0% 3,038$       1.37  
6.3 Commodity Price Variation Results 
Base case commodity price forecasts were modeled on FAPRI’s most recent forecasts for 
commodity prices and yields from 2010 through 2014 from Table 5.2. Results of the base 
case commodity scenarios are illustrated in section two of (Base Case Commodity) Table 
6.1. Best case commodity price forecasts were also modeled on a +10% increase from 
FAPRI’s forecast with results summarized in section one of (Best Case Commodity) Table 
6.1. Worst case commodity prices were modeled with an adjustment for the years 2011 
through 2014 set at levels proposed in RMA’s SRA Draft2 with the results summarized in 
section three of (Worst Case Commodity) Table 6.1.  
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In comparing results for commodity price variations, at the most likely policy retention 
assumption of 92% in year 1 and 90% in year 2, the base case commodity scenario (Line 2, 
Section 2, Table 6.1) yielded a slight positive NPV of $106,000 at a purchase price of 2.5 
times 2009 commission, an internal rate of return of 7.1%, and a breakeven purchase price 
of 2.55 times 2009 commission or $5.656 million. This seems logical considering the 
multiple paid for Acquisition A, based on 2007 commission income was 2.34 times 2007 
commission income. In the best case scenario examined (Line 2, Section 1, Table 6.1), the 
model yielded a net present value of $878,000, an internal rate of return of 12.3%, and a 
breakeven purchase price of $6.426 million or 2.90 times 2009 commission. In the worst 
case scenario examined (Line 2, Section 3, Table 6.1), the model yielded a net present 
value of -$2.149 million at a purchase price of 2.5 times 2009 commission income, a  
-14.0% internal rate of return, and a breakeven purchase price of $3.400 million or 1.53 
times 2009 commission income. 
In considering the impact of commodity price only, with all other factors held constant, 
acquisition prices in the range of 2.50 times the 2009 commission would achieve the return 
target of approximately 6.31% IRR, if FAPRI’s commodity price forecast is accurate and if 
there are no significant changes to the commodity formula in the SRA. However, in the 
worst case commodity price scenario, which incorporates the currently proposed changes in 
commodity prices for commission calculation in SRA Draft2, returns are negative on an 
acquisition at 2.5 times 2009 commission amount. This situation loses 38% of the initial 
investment in terms of NPV and produces an IRR of -14% over the course of five years. If 
the SRA is enacted at these proposed levels for commodity basis for commissions, 
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acquisition prices would need to be reduced by approximately 38%, which would yield a 
multiple of approximately 1.5 times the 2009 commission amount. 
6.4 Policy Retention Variation Results 
The policy retention scenarios were examined. The base retention scenario consists of 92% 
retention in year 1 and 90% retention in year 2. This retention scenario is consistent with 
results from a larger agency acquisition (Acquisition A) from FCSAmerica history. These 
retention rates are also consistent with, or slightly less than, FCSAmerica portfolio 
retention rates. The best case retention scenario assumes a 95% retention rate in years 1 and 
2. Although this retention rate was achieved in year 1 with Acquisition A, these retention 
rates may not be attainable and represent the upper boundary for retention experience in an 
acquisition. The worst case retention scenario is estimated at a 75% in year 1 and an 85% 
retention rate in year 2. The two year net rate approximates the experience of FCSAmerica 
in Acquisition B, when all personal relationships turned over and there was not sufficient 
retention strategy in place to mitigate the circumstances. 
Sensitivity results of the three retention rate scenarios, at base case commodity prices, 
yielded a NPV range from $609,000 to $-1.2 million (Column 1, Section 2, Table 6.1) and 
an internal rate of return range from 10.4% to -3.2% Column 2, Section 2, Table 6.1). The 
results and impact of retention rate differences were more significant in the best case, or 
increasing, commodity price scenario, with the range increasing to nearly a $2 million in 
NPV difference (Column 1, Section 1, Table 6.1). In the worst case commodity price 
scenario, the range was reduced to a little over $1 million in NPV difference (Column 1, 
Section 3, Table 6.1), but is still significant to the acquisition price and return on 
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investment. These results emphasize the critical importance of a pre-sale evaluation of 
factors impacting retention rates and a post-sale plan to mitigate competitive pressures, 
quickly establish new relationships, and thereby maximize policy retention rate. 
6.5 Commission Variation Results 
Commission rate reduction levels were also examined. The current consensus in the 
industry is an expectation of reduced commissions in 2011 and beyond, the result of current 
SRA negotiations underway. Current insurance company estimates are for a 20% reduction 
in commission rates and a possibility of a range from 5-30%. Therefore the sensitivity 
analysis was completed on a base assumption of a 20% reduction, and on reduction rates of 
10% and 30% 
Commission sensitivity results in the base commodity case reduced the NPV by $612,000 
for each 10 percentage point reduction in the commission rate (Column 1, Section 4, Table 
6.1). In the worst case commodity scenario, the net impact was less, with a reduction in 
NPV of $362,000 for each 10 percentage point reduction in the commission rate (Column 
1, Section 5, Table 6.1). Results of the sensitivity analysis to commission rates, although 
not as significant as commodity prices and retention rates is an important factor to monitor 
and adjust once the SRA negotiations are final. 
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CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Summary 
The U.S. crop insurance program became an essential risk management tool for crop 
producers in the United States in the 1980s. Since the implementation of the 2008 Farm 
Bill and with the significant increase in crop production costs since 2008, Federal crop 
insurance subsidies have increased in importance relative to commodity program 
payments. At the individual producer level, Federal crop insurance subsidies may now be 
more critical as an income safety net than commodity program payments. The combined 
influence of these factors has underscored the importance of crop insurance as an important 
risk management mitigation tool for grain farmers and lenders in the U.S. An agricultural 
lender, such as FCSAmerica, may be able to justify a role in the delivery and sales of crop 
insurance to customers on these reasons alone. Assurance of broad availability of crop 
insurance products, sound counseling on insurance products for loan customers, and 
political support and influence at the Federal level can be justified because of the 
importance of crop insurance to a lender’s risk management of the loan portfolio.  
Currently subsidy levels are under pressure from the Obama Administration due to a 
general desire to reduce agricultural subsidies and the Federal budget deficit and the 
perception of excessive insurance industry profits. The objective of this thesis was to 
determine if an incremental crop insurance agency acquisition is still feasible for 
FCSAmerica. It is important to note that the objective and the acquisition evaluation model 
are focused on incremental acquisitions and incremental income and expenses. Even 
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though some conclusions regarding industry profit levels and returns may be drawn, it is 
not the objective of this thesis.  
A survey of both the economic events and the political climate impacting the future of the 
crop insurance industry reveals two conclusions. First, the crop insurance industry has 
likely experienced a peak in commission revenues from 2007 through 2010. The industry 
should anticipate a decline in gross commissions due to lower federal subsidy levels. 
Second, there is a great degree of uncertainty in the form and level of future federal subsidy 
levels. Federal support exists in the form of subsidies for producer premiums and insurance 
company administrative and operating expense reimbursements. Insurance company 
expense reimbursements are currently under pressure through negotiations on the Standard 
Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) and will likely experience a reduction from historical 
levels. The level and formula for reductions will likely not be known until July of 2010, but 
the reductions will affect commission revenues for crop insurance years beginning in 2011. 
Producer level subsidies are under debate, but are not likely to be significantly impacted 
until the next major farm bill. The level of premium subsidy impact for producers, and the 
likely affects of any reduction, is not known, but current trends would not likely increase 
subsidy or producer participation levels. Uncertainty can also exist in the form of future 
changes to individual products approved by RMA, which could have an impact to producer 
participation levels or to insurance commission levels. 
Any analysis of crop insurance agency acquisitions, and any valuation modeling, must 
account for the general trends in the industry and be adaptable to accommodate future 
changes in federal subsidies. The current status of the re-negotiation of the SRA is of 
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importance to industry agent commissions and, as a result, places a caution on any 
acquisition action until the SRA is final because this will likely reduce commissions and 
decrease profit opportunities for the next several years. However, these subsidy pressures 
may also represent opportunities to acquire agencies due to reduced competition, a general 
concern with the future of the industry, and a further drive toward consolidation resulting 
from cost efficiencies gained by larger scale agencies and potential insurance company 
consolidations. 
Analysis of the net present value (NPV) of incremental agency acquisitions indicates that 
the most important variables in agency net revenue are commodity price levels, 
commission rates, and policy retention rates. This project focused on building an agency 
acquisition analysis model with these three components driving income based on 
FCSAmerica’s experience.  
Financial analysis and acquisition modeling support that crop insurance agency 
acquisitions are and will be feasible under a wide range of future economic and political 
scenarios. The wide range of assumptions, however, will contribute to a range of potential 
purchase prices and return rates on purchases. Model results are based on two measures, 
the internal rate of return (IRR) and the commission multiple. The IRR measure is broadly 
recognized and permits evaluation of the acquisition relative to other investment 
opportunities and broad company business goals. The commission multiple is the most 
typical index reference used in the crop insurance industry relative to agency acquisitions. 
It is typically derived from the last year’s commission revenue and is often used in the bid 
and ask process in agency acquisition negotiations.  
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NPV results indicate that a hypothetical agency acquisition at 2.5 times the 2009 
commission amount would yield an internal rate of return of 7.1% under the base case 
assumptions for commodity prices, commission rates, and policy retention rate. The base 
case is for commodity prices to follow the forecast of the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI), commission rates to be reduced by 20% in 2011 and forward, 
and a historical average policy retention rate based on FCSAmerica’s range of experiences. 
The base case model would meet FCSAmerica’s target for return based on a weighted 
average cost of capital of 6.3%. Some upside potential exists if commodity prices are 
higher than FAPRI’s forecast and/or if policy retention rates are better than average. A 10% 
increase in commodity prices could yield an IRR of 12.3%, or support a 2.90 multiple. 
Using an optimistic policy retention rate would result in a 10.4% IRR, or support a 2.77 
multiple.  
The pessimistic case modeling scenarios assumed commodity prices at levels currently 
proposed in the second draft of the SRA in years 2011 through 2015 for corn and for 
soybeans. Although it is unlikely that the final SRA will be at these levels, it is believed to 
be a plausible level of commodity prices to base commission income on. Although the 
implied pricing levels would be substantially below the base case price levels and well 
below historical sales levels, the model indicates that agency acquisitions could be made to 
meet FCSAmerica investment yield targets. The range of multiples imply that this 
pessimistic case commodity price scenario would be from 1.18 to 1.67 times the 2009 
commission level. These multiples would imply a 39% reduction in the value of an agency 
with implementation of the changes currently proposed in the second draft of the SRA. 
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7.2 Conclusions 
An initial observation resulting from this project is the degree of influence that policy 
retention levels have on the profitability of an acquisition. Even though the high impact of 
policy retention and the influence of personal relationships on retention are well known, the 
project quantifies the impact of various retention levels. By measuring the impact, this 
project emphasizes that policy retention factors should also be considered in the initial 
price negotiation and valuation modeling of individual agency acquisition opportunities. 
The analysis and research underscores the need for a very active policy retention strategy 
for up to two years post closing. Policy retention and the orderly transition of business 
relationships are critical to the profit potential in the first two years of an acquisition. Price 
negotiations must include a non-compete clause and should consider an employment 
retention package for key sales person and/or owners. The agency acquisition model 
completed for this project would indicate that a post acquisition employment agreement for 
key transition employees could be attractive for both parties. Targeting this package to a 
two year net retention rate in the range of 70-95% could essentially profit share on the net 
income from those policies and benefit both parties.  
Other observations from this project can be summarized as potential acquisition strategy 
and contract term opportunities in the forthcoming crop insurance business environment. 
First, the current negative environment may provide more acquisition opportunities than in 
the past when commissions were rising and agents were enjoying strong profitability. The 
current environment not only has negative implications for commission levels, but the 
longer term outlook is also negative with respect to the general level of subsidy to producer 
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premium amounts. A well researched and flexible acquisition strategy and valuation model 
may be useful in more of a buyer’s market than the last several years have represented. In 
addition, this environment may present more of an opportunity for a flexible purchase 
agreement. Consideration should be given to deferring a portion of the acquisition price 
with the deferred portion being dependent on policy retention rates, commission amounts, a 
commodity price index, or some combination of these factors.  
Final conclusions from this project center on the main objective from the perspective a 
large agency in this industry. The crop insurance sales industry faces a good deal of 
uncertainty in the near future, but almost certainly will be an industry where the available 
market is limited and general industry profitability will decline significantly relative to 
2007 to 2010. The crop insurance agency at FCSAmerica represents a key risk 
management service for FCSAmerica stockholders and a key risk mitigation tool for 
FCSAmerica’s loan portfolio. These are intrinsic benefits that are difficult to value, but 
necessary to consider in decisions to expand, maintain, or shrink the insurance services 
division. FCSAmerica currently has a substantial regional market share and represents one 
of the largest crop insurance agencies in the U.S. An expansion strategy can make sense in 
an industry with declining profit margins, if acquisitions are priced such that net 
incremental policy acquisitions generate more income over incremental expenses and 
contribute to the dilution of fixed or overhead expenses and investments that FCSAmerica 
has already made. With reduced commissions and general industry profit levels, 
incremental acquisitions may be profitable provided these acquisitions can be made in 
locations where existing infrastructure and support services can support the acquisition. 
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